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Strategic Guidance. There is risk in moving F-35A procurement to the future years, but it is feasible to achieve the new strategic objectives in the Defense Strategic Guidance.
F-35 Risk During Department of Defense Financial Crisis
The Department of Defense (DoD) provides military resources to protect the security of the United States of America. Today's DoD is facing a fiscal challenge unlike any event in history. In the Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 President's Budget President Barack Obama wrote "we are facing a make-or-break moment for the middle class, and for all those who are fighting to get there. What is at stake is whether or not this will be a country where working people can earn enough to raise a family, build modest savings, own a home, and secure their retirement. This is the defining issue of our time. Defense strategy and priorities." 4 The QDR sets a long-term course for the DoD to assess U.S. threats and challenges while re-balancing the DoD's strategies, capabilities, and forces to address today's conflicts and tomorrow's threats. 5 The fiscal challenge and newly emerging strategic interests set the stage for the DoD to release new strategic guidance for the DoD titled "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense." This new Defense Strategic Guidance aimed to maintain the security of the United States, its allies, and partners; maintain the prosperity of open and free international economics; and maintain international order and uphold the rights and responsibilities of nations and people. 6 The current United States budget crisis could impact every program from Social Two of the core functions most closely related to the F-35A are Air Superiority and Global Precision Attack. Air Superiority describes the U.S. ability "to deter and defeat adversaries in multiple conflicts and across all domains," or the ability to dominate the enemy in contested skies. 10 The requirement to achieve air superiority places a great strain on the current aircraft. 21 Congress supported the JSF from the beginning as well 22 , but with all the changes in schedule and cost, coupled with constrained budgets for the United States military, it is uncertain how long the support will last. Vice Admiral David Venlet, the Institutional risk is the DoD's ability to produce effective and efficient organizations and processes over the short, mid, and long-term. 27 There is institutional risk for the F-35A in several areas including acquisition reform, optimizing the information technology process, and maintaining the defense industrial base. 28 This section will focus specifically on the risk associated with acquisition reform and maintaining the defense industrial base. Even with the previously highlighted cost and program issues, the JSF has acquisition initiatives worthy to benchmark for future acquisition programs with respect to design and testing, commonality, and international participation. Once the F-35A program office solves the remaining technical issues and full rate production starts, the contractor claims the fly-away cost will be lower than the current estimate, which is normal once production starts. Another success is the effort to design a 70-90% common platform between the three variants for the Navy, Marine
Corps, and Air Force. Also worth mentioning is the international effort to design, fund, and produce the JSF. Although "International participation may not be the most costeffective way for the U.S. to develop the JSF," 29 Suppliers chosen during the JSF development phase will likely remain on the program through production…contracts awarded now will likely affect the future shape of the defense industrial base." 33 There are hundreds of national and international large and small businesses who stand to benefit from the JSF program throughout the U.S. and at least eight countries world-wide. 34 The defense industrial base should continue to survive and thrive with a $300+ billion JSF contract, but there is still significant risk. There has been significant progress made in the restructuring of the production schedule after the Nunn-McCurdy breach;
however, the fact remains that the program is behind schedule and well over originally estimated costs. 35 The Operational risk describes the ability of the current force to execute a strategy successfully within acceptable human, materiel, financial, and strategic costs.
Operational risk requires the DoD to assess its ability to execute current, planned, and contingency operations in the near term. 38 To determine the operational risk, it is important to look at the QDR and evaluate the risk of slipping F-35A production to future years and have existing fighter inventory fill the gap in production. This will shed light on the level of operational risk. The main strategy of the 2010 QDR is to prevail in today's wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force. 39 The Air "to meet future, unforeseen demands" 42 and a reliance on coalition partners to "build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U.S. influence." 43 These new tenets for military operations show the need for a multi-service, multi-nation JSF program. However these attempts will be futile if the effects of sequestration end up taking money away from the JSF to help reduce the national deficit.
Delays of F-35A procurement over the last few years caused the Air Force to contract a $3 billion Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP) for some F-16s. The upgrade will extend the service life an additional 2,000 hours and add about eight years of life to the fighter. The upgrade will also improve avionics with an improved defense suite, data link enhancements, and radar upgrades. 44 Major General Jay Lindell, Air
Force director of global power programs said "we expect some viability out of the F-16 fleet if we [are] going to spend that much money to SLEP the aircraft." 45 What is uncertain is the future maintenance cost of an aging F-16 fleet even with the SLEP. The savings from the F-35A production slip should pay for the increased costs to operate legacy aircraft. This leaves the Air Force and the DoD with a less capable and less modern force at a risk of not being able to complete the future mission.
Acquisition officials view risk differently than operational planners and senior leaders in the Air Force. This could lead to a belief that there is low risk in delaying the F-35A production as the United States knows of no comparable operational threat to air superiority. One area of concern is a potential conflict between the U.S. and China.
However, the economic interdependence of each country decreases the threat of conflict. Recent events between China and Japan and Taiwan do not eliminate the possibility that something could happen in the future-the U.S. does not want lack of preparation to be an excuse for failure. 46 The U.S. wants to have air superiority as was the case in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. Libya is a current operational model for dealing with corrupt governments causing their citizens to suffer unnecessarily, and air power played a key role in ending a bad situation. 47 The operational risk is low if the U.S. faces non-peer conflict. The operational risk will increase tremendously if other nations increase their level of technology of air-to-air and air-to-ground threats that will equal or potentially outmatch what the Air Force and DoD have to operationally protect the citizens of the U.S. and our allies.
The overall F-35A risk from a force management perspective is low to medium.
Force management risk, which is "our ability to recruit, retain, train, educate, and equip the All-Volunteer Force, and to sustain its readiness and morale." 48 Force management risk requires the DoD to examine how well it provides trained and ready personnel, equipment, and command and control in the near, mid, and long-term. 49 The military recruits Americans every year answering a call to serve and make a difference. Some join the military for the many benefits, including health care, education, job stability, and retirement benefits. Thanks to these volunteers, the Air Force and the DoD have consistently made recruiting goals for many years. FY 2012 was no different, with all
Services making 100% of their recruitment goals. 50 The Air Force Recruiting Service's mission is "to inspire, engage and recruit the brightest, most competitive and diverse men and women for service in America's Air Force. Air Force Recruiting Service recruits quality Airmen from a cross-section of America, responsive to the ever-changing needs of the Air Force." 51 While recruiting is strong, so is retention; the Air Force recently implemented measures to reduce end-strength to congressionally mandated levels for all ranks. The voluntary and involuntary force management programs help the Air Force to continue to size and shape, but a requirement still exists to have the right balance of skills to meet all future mission needs. 52 The reductions implemented since 2004 have resulted in an almost 58,000 manpower reduction in the Active, National Guard, and
Reserve components of the Air Force. 53 
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Whether or not people join the Air Force to be a part of the F-35A, the number of aircraft produced could affect retention in the future. As the programs stands, 1,763 aircraft will replace aging F-16s and A-10s. This quantity justifies a certain end-strength as the older aircraft phase out and F-35As phase in. In September of 2012 the first airmen attained the initial level of certification for organic maintenance, which is a major step to developing the future maintainers of the F-35A-but there is a long way to go. 54 Having maintenance personnel able to perform what F-35A pilots are currently doing frees the pilots to focus more on flying and allows for more timely maintenance of the jets. Pilots used to perform their own engine maintenance, and this was valuable training, but the balance between maintenance exposure and pilot workload had become a challenge. 55 This is a crucial first step to establishing Air Force maintainers and creates a program to transition future maintainers to the F-35A. There is also an issue with training pilots to fly the F-35A, as there are only nine test aircraft at Eglin Air Force Base. This, too, will improve when Eglin becomes the site for the F-35A training squadron, with plans for Nellis Air Force Base to stand up the first F-35A weapons school program. As with the maintainers, the number of pilots will continue to grow as more F-35As become available. As long as the current production timeline holds, there will be enough maintainers and pilots when the aircraft roll off the production line. The biggest concern is if the program gets cut and procurement numbers drop significantly.
While current F-16 inventory is large, it will only be sufficient for a short time into the future. Crucial upgrades are starting to happen as part of a SLEP, but this will only make the F-16 viable for another 8 years. If there is not a sufficient quantity of F-35As to replace the F-16, the risk would shift to medium or high. 58 Performing SLEP and other upgrades to F-16s may not answer this threat. To meet future (CCDR requirements, the U.S. must be ready and able to support all scenarios; but if there are multiple areas of combat, the greater threat will receive the most fifth-generation assets and all other available assets will go to the lesser threat. This is the best scenario for 15 combating future threats until the F-35A reaches full production and allows for maximum flexibility and preparedness.
Politics is another future risk jeopardizing the entire JSF program. With the multiservice, multi-nation approach to procurement, it should survive politically; but the current fiscal situation lends itself to potential major reductions in production quantities. 59 Joint military and international support for the JSF lowers the risk of program termination. The future risk is medium, with the final quantity procured being the decisive factor to lower or raise the risk level with respect to emerging adversary technology.
Priorities for 21st Century Defense
In January of 2012, the President and Secretary of Defense unveiled a strategy for 21st Century defense. It differs from the QDR by shifting emphasis from today's wars to preparing for future challenges. Another major difference is the focus on the Joint Force of 2020 by providing "a set of precepts that will help guide decision regarding the size and shape of the force over subsequent program and budget cycles." 60 The strategy takes risks, embraces the current fiscal situation, but does not account for a potential $500 billion additional reduction through sequestration. 61 The President spoke of the risk measured as "an approach that will keep our nation safe and our military the finest that the world [has] ever known." 62 The joint role in Asia will grow, and the F-22
and F-35A are well suited for this type of environment. Another aircraft in design to help meet the growing need of A2/AD is the long-range strike bomber initially announced in the FY 2012 Air Force President's Budget Rollout. 63 This, along with other publically unknown secret programs, will strive to meet the threat laid out in the Defense Strategic Guidance.
16
The risk scenario is slightly altered based on this new strategy. The institutional risk remains the same from the QDR, medium to high, based on the acquisition challenges thus far, and the potential fiscal reductions coming if sequestration happens.
If sequestration doesn't lower the JSF procurement level, one more production delay or cost overrun will. If the JSF lowers production quantities, this could negatively affect the defense industrial base if specific expertise is not needed by the United States and foreign adversaries seek to obtain the expertise to advance their own defense technology. The new Defense Strategic Guidance focus on Asia should keep the operational risk low to medium. Operational risk should also remain low to medium based on the A2/AD threat in the Pacific theater, but again this could change if the U.S.
has to respond to a significant threat from China. Force management risk for personnel stays low; there will be a need to maintain, support, and operate the technology we have and will procure in the future. However this could increase if new programs are not developed; then fewer military and civilian personnel is needed to support these new programs. If the DoD successfully procures the JSF in reasonable quantities to meet our new Defense Strategic Guidance, the future challenge risk remains medium. If all the Defense Strategic Guidance goals cannot be met while we try to solve our fiscal crisis, the risk will be higher. The longer it takes to acquire, field, and deliver the right platforms, the higher the future challenge risk will be.
Conclusion
The DoD operates in a strategic risk-reward world. Ultimately, the goal for the DoD is to align programs and people to maximize flexibility in responding to those who threaten our national interests. The QDR sets a long-term course for the DoD as it assesses the threats and challenges the nation faces and re-balances the DoD's strategies, capabilities, and forces to address today's conflicts and tomorrow's threats. 64 The QDR sets the stage for the DoD to accomplish national objectives, but deepened fiscal austerity and new Defense Strategic Guidance have altered the strategic risk to maintain the security of the United States, and its allies and partners. The F-35A procurement delay announced in the FY13 Air Force President's Budget was another strategic decision with direct effects to the institutional, operational, force management, and future challenges risks. An adversary may not be able to match the capabilities of the F-35A once procured; but in the time it takes to get them fielded, the U.S. will not know how its adversaries will advance to counteract current capabilities.
Operating under new Defense Strategic Guidance coupled with the current budget woes, the future challenges, institutional, and operational risk could be affected the most. The new focus on Asia and the Middle East and the cost to maintain our legacy aircraft while we wait for the F-35A increase the risk for our nation every day.
The F-35A is an expensive fighter in a time of austere funding, but provides capabilities to defeat adversary threats and meets the objectives of the QDR and the Defense Strategic Guidance. Sequestration could decimate the DoD budget, but President
Obama believes "we can keep our military strong and our nation secure with a defense budget that continues to be larger than roughly the next 10 countries combined." 65 One cannot put a price tag on national security; what shouldn't happen are political stalemates affecting risk through mandatory cuts as sequestration would entail. Former SECDEF Robert Gates supported national security, but clearly stated that technology is no longer affordable when it "incurs unacceptable cost and risk." 66 The goal of the Air Force is to achieve air dominance often and early over the enemy, but if the F-35A does
